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The Recent Wave of Arbitrations Against
Argentina Under Bilateral Investment
Treaties: Background and
Principal Legal Issues
Paolo Di Rosa*
I.

INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY

One of the consequences on an international level of the measures adopted by the Government of Argentina in connection with
the economic crisis suffered by that country in late 2001 and early
2002 has been a welter of international arbitral claims filed by
foreign investors pursuant to the dispute resolution clauses of
Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs") to which Argentina is a
party.
There are currently over 2000 BITs in force worldwide.1
These are relatively new instruments in international law, as the2
vast majority of them were concluded as recently as the 1990s.
These treaties establish various substantive and procedural protections for foreign investors, such as bars against expropriation
without adequate compensation and guarantees of fair and equitable treatment and non-discrimination.
The BITs also typically include dispute resolution clauses
that enable individual investors to file claims directly against foreign states in international arbitral fora. The BIT dispute resolution clauses usually grant to the investor the option of either filing
claims in the local courts of the host State, or of initiating an
international arbitration. The latter can be an ad hoc arbitration
* Paolo Di Rosa is a partner at Winston & Strawn LLP, where he heads the
Washington, D.C. office's Latin America Arbitration Practice. This article is based on
an oral presentation by the author at the University of Miami Inter-American Law
Review Symposium on International Arbitration on April 2, 2004, in Miami, Florida.
The author represents several claimants in arbitration matters against the Argentine
Republic. The views expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of
Winston & Strawn LLP, or of the author's clients.
1. Third World Network, WTO Symposium Debates Investment Issue (June 17,
2003), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twninfo29.htm (last visited Jan.
12, 2005).
2. U.

NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

36-37, U.N. Sales No. E. 99-1-112463-8 (1999). See
also Bilateral Investment Treaties, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/
treaties.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
AGREEMENTS: AN OVERVIEW, at
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or an arbitration before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a World Bank-affiliated
arbitration institution established pursuant to the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (hereinafter "Washington Convention").' Over 140 countries are currently parties to the Washington Convention.4
The right that BITs confer on individual investors to seek
legal recourse directly against States is a novel feature, as it obviates the need for investors to follow the traditional procedure in
international law of obtaining redress against a foreign State by
seeking diplomatic protection and espousal of its claim by its state
of nationality against the State hosting the investment. An ICSID
Tribunal stressed in a recent case:
[T]he greatest innovation of ICSID and other systems
directed at the protection of foreign investments is precisely that the rights of the investors are not any longer
subject to the political and other considerations by their
governments, as was the case under the old system of diplomatic protection, often resulting in an interference with
those rights. Investors may today claim independently
from the view of their governments.'
Almost all of the arbitral claims filed against Argentina have
been brought before ICSID. There are thirty-five ICSID cases
pending against Argentina as of this writing.6 Most of these
claims are based on the measures adopted by the Argentine Government in response to the economic crisis of late 2001 and early
2002 (hereafter, "the emergency measures"). This article focuses
mainly on the claims related to the emergency measures.
In their multi-million dollar arbitral claims, the claimants
allege that Argentina violated various substantive protections
afforded to investors under the BITs. The principal BIT provisions invoked by the claimants are those that require the Parties
to the treaty to do the following: (1) provide compensation for
3. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States ("Washington Convention"), done at Washington on Mar.
18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966).
4. See List of ContractingStates and other Signatoriesof the Convention, at http:/
/www.worldbank.orglicsid/constate/c-states-en.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
5. Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01103,
37 (Decision on
Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) of Aug. 2, 2004).
6. List of Pending Cases, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
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expropriatory acts; (2) guarantee fair and equitable treatment for
foreign investors; and (3) guarantee non-discrimination and treatment no worse than that afforded to nationals of the host State
and to third party nationals. These three BIT provisions are
explored in greater detail later in this Article.7
The claimants in the thirty-five pending ICSID cases against
Argentina include foreign companies that invested in various sectors of the Argentine economy. Many of the cases were brought by
companies that invested in the Argentine public utility companies
privatized in the 1990s. These foreign investors alleged that the
emergency measures adversely affected their investments in violation of the BITs in force between Argentina and the State of
which the investor is a national. Argentina has at least 50 BITs
currently in force."
Of the eighty-five claims pending as of this writing before
ICSID, over forty-one percent are against Argentina, by far the
greatest number of claims any single country has ever faced before
ICSID.9 Moreover, this is the first time during the almost four
decades the Washington Convention has been in force that there
has been a raft of claims by separate claimants arising out of a
single operative nucleus of facts - in this case, the emergency
measures (discussed below).
Aside from their unprecedented nature, the ICSID arbitral
claims against Argentina (hereinafter also, "the Argentina
claims") have raised interesting legal and political issues. This
Article examines the political and economic background of these
claims, particularly those involving the privatized public utilities
and then describes some of the key legal issues. The focus is principally, although not exclusively, on the jurisdictional aspects of
the Argentina claims, since, to date, there have been no rulings on
the merits, whereas a sufficient number of jurisdictional decisions
have been issued enabling some patterns to be identified and conclusions to be drawn.
7. Other BIT provisions invoked in the Argentina cases, but not explored herein,
include the guarantee of full protection and security and clauses regarding
repatriationof capital.
8. AGENCIA DE DESARROLLO DE INVERSIONES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: A LATIN
AMERICAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK COMPARISON, available at http://www.inversiones.gov.
ar/documentos/legislation ied eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
9. See List of Pending Cases, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/casesl

pending.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (reflecting that 35 out of the 85 (41.2%)
pending cases are against Argentina).
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POLITICAL/ECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Since the Argentina claims are based on government measures ostensibly adopted to alleviate an economic crisis, notwithstanding the adverse impact of such measures on foreign
investors, a brief review of the political and economic background
is useful.
A.

The Argentine State Reform Programof the Late
1980s and the 1990s

Argentina faced a deep institutional crisis in the 1980s. Its
numerous problems included a bloated and inefficient State apparatus and an economy in shambles as a result of a crippling hyperinflation and a severe currency exchange crisis. These problems
prompted a far-reaching State reform program, undertaken by the
administration of President Carlos Menem, who assumed power
in 1989.
One of the main measures adopted to control these fiscal
problems - the reversal of which measures later became a key
aspect of the problems that gave rise to the Argentina claims was the adoption of legislation known as the "Convertibility
Law."1" This law created a currency board-like monetary system
that pegged local currency (initially the austral, then the peso) to
the U.S. dollar on a one-to-one basis. The monetary authority was
required to back the local currency in circulation with foreign currency reserves (thus making each peso fully "convertible" to one
U.S. dollar). 1 This Convertibility Law helped to control the inflation problem, in part because it prevented the State from financing deficits by printing money.
Another key measure adopted in connection with the State
reform program - and also one that has substantial relevance in
connection with the recent ICSID claims - was the restructuring
of the public sector and the privatization of a massive number of
State entities. These companies included State-owned public utility enterprises privatized through long-term concessions and
licenses.
The State undertook a comprehensive program to attract for10. Law No. 23.928, March 27, 1991, [LXI-B] A.D.L.A. 1752, amended by Law No.
25.445, June 21, 2001, [LXI-D] A.D.L.A. 4043.
11. This requirement was relaxed somewhat at different times, which was one of
the reasons that the system was not an orthodox currency board, but rather a
currency board-like system.
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eign investors to the public utilities sector. This was based on its
perception that there existed a dearth of operators in the local
market with sufficient experience and financial solvency to operate the public utilities with the requisite degree of skill and level
of infrastructural investment. The program included the repeal of
restrictions on foreign investment and the establishment of various legal guarantees to investors. These investor-friendly measures were advertised far and wide with the assistance of leading
U.S. investment banking firms. Additionally, senior-level Argentine officials conducted road shows in which government officials
promoted a "new" Argentina that they pledged would provide a
stable and secure environment for foreign investors interested in
making safe long-term investments. Simultaneously, and further
to the effort to provide protections and assurances to foreign
investors, the Argentine Government undertook an ambitious program of BIT negotiations, leading to the signature and entry into
force of over fifty such treaties over the course of the 1990s.
The government fully reformed the regulatory frameworks of
the relevant sectors and prepared concession contracts with provisions designed to provide maximum protection to foreign investors
in order to attract them to the newly privatized public utility companies. These provisions included mechanisms intended to shield
investors against potential variations in tariff rates, inflation and
currency exchange rates. One provision, common in many concession contracts for water, gas, and power distribution services, was
a measure enabling concessionaires to calculate their tariffs (i.e.,
utility rates) in U.S. dollars ("USD"), and then for billing purposes
to convert this dollar figure to pesos at the prevailing exchange
rate (set at that time by law at a ratio of one peso to one USD).
Other protections included provisions enabling adjustments to the
tariffs based on variations in the concessionaire's costs, indexation
clauses tied to U.S. producer and consumer price indices (designed
to protect against inflation), and other provisions enabling the
State regulatory entities to adjust tariff rates to ensure that tariffs were "fair and reasonable" and that they provided a "reasonable rate of return." Such terms were typically embodied in the
new laws establishing totally revamped regulatory frameworks
12
and/or in the relevant contracts.
Although one of the principal objectives of this tariff system
was to attract foreign investors by guaranteeing them a reasona12. See, e.g., Law. No. 24.065, Jan. 3, 1992, [LII-Al A.D.L.A. 83 (establishing a new
regulatory framework law for the electrical sector).
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ble return on their investment, the tariff schedules - from the very
beginning and at all times thereafter - were within the control of
the State through the regulatory entities. The concessionaires
enjoyed no discretion to determine the rates they could charge.
Rather, they had to abide by tariff schedules set by the State,
including an initial tariff schedule spanning the duration of a
specified number of years (in some instances ten years) that had
been established prior to the public bidding contests through
which the utilities were privatized. Thus, consumers were
charged at rates set by the Government, and the investor was in
turn protected by the guarantees of the regulatory reforms and
concession contracts.
Ultimately, the process of privatization of the public utilities,
especially in the power sector, was successful from the point of
view of the State, as it resulted in most cases, in lucrative offers
for the concession rights and the injection into the market of internationally renowned operators. These operators were later successful in modernizing the utilities, and in many instances,
eventually provided better services at lower tariffs than did the
former State-owned entities. By the end of the 1990s, the State
privatization program had led to many billions of U.S. dollars of
investment in Argentina 3 and attracted sophisticated multinational companies that had been drawn to Argentina in great
part by the new legal framework and the promises and guarantees
provided by the Argentine Government.
B.

Argentina's Emergency Measures in Response to
the Economic Crisis of Late 2001/Early 2002

Despite the outward appearance of a stable and growing economy in the 1990s, several phenomena occurred throughout the
decade that precipitated a severe economic crisis in Argentina by
the beginning of the following decade. The nature and origins of
such phenomena transcend the scope of this Article, but they
include, inter alia, an excessive level of indebtedness by the State,
infelicitously timed tax reforms, and other government measures
that were then exacerbated by international monetary crises that
created a ripple effect on Argentina. The crisis peaked in December 2001, prompting on January 6, 2002, the enactment of the
13. See Permanent Secretariat of SELA, Latin American Council, Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI)in Latin America and the Caribbean,available at http://www.sela.
org/public-htmlIAA2K2/eng/consejo/spclxxviiidi3/spclxxviiidi3-2.htm#marc2
(last
visited Jan. 12, 2005).
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"Public Emergency Law of 2002. "14 This law terminated the oneto-one "convertibility system" and, together with follow-up regulations and decrees, allowed the peso to float on the currency market, leading to a substantial devaluation of the peso against the
USD. The peso devalued to a level of four pesos to one USD before
settling at a ratio of three pesos to one USD, where it approximately remains today.
At the same time, however, the Public Emergency Law contained provisions targeting the public utility sector. Specifically,
the law mandated that the privatized utility companies continue
using a currency conversion formula from dollars to pesos - for
billing purposes - of one dollar to one peso, a requirement that
substantially altered the economic and financial basis of the utilities' business due to the sharp devaluation of the peso. The net
effect of this provision of the law is best illustrated with pre- and
post-emergency law examples of an electrical bill for a hypothetical residential consumer. Let us posit a consumer's bill calculated
by the electric distribution company, prior to enactment of the
Public Emergency Law and pursuant to the tariff schedule set by
the State on the basis of the distributors' costs, at thirty USD.
This figure was then converted to pesos for billing purposes. Since
by law the exchange rate was one to one, the bill was charged out
to the consumer at thirty pesos, which upon receipt by the utility
company from the consumer were then fully convertible by the
utility company to thirty USD.
The same bill, following enactment of the Public Emergency
Law, was calculated at thirty USD and still billed out at thirty
pesos (because the Public Emergency Law mandated that a oneto-one exchange rate be used for billing). However, because the
convertibility system had been scrapped and the peso consequently had floated and devalued three-fold, the value of those
thirty pesos received from the consumer was only a third of what
it had been before because now the utility company could convert
the thirty pesos received from the consumer only to approximately
ten USD. This phenomenon is known as the "pesification" of the
tariffs.
At the same time that it "pesified" the tariffs in this manner,
the Public Emergency Law also froze the tariff rates at their thenexisting levels, thereby preventing any periodic or other adjustments contemplated by the regulatory framework laws and by the
14. Law No. 25.561, Jan. 6, 2002, [LXII-A A.D.L.A. 44.
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relevant concession contracts. The public utility companies thus
had their rates frozen at January 2002 levels, even though many
of them were due for a periodic revision or other adjustment under
the pertinent concession contract. 5 Further compounding the
constraints faced by these companies, the Public Emergency Law
also ordered these companies to continue fully to abide by their
obligations under their respective concession contracts, and
authorized the executive branch to renegotiate the public utility
concession contracts by the end of 2002.1"
The net consequence for the utility companies was a roughly
two-thirds reduction in income due both to the "pesification" of the
tariffs and to the inability to obtain any upward adjustment on
them (as a result of the "freezing" of the rates). These constraints
have crippled such companies in part because tariffs constitute
the only source of revenue for many public utilities (such as electrical distribution companies). In addition, the utility companies
are still required to pay for many of their costs (imported equipment, etc.) in hard currency. Moreover, practically all of the debt
incurred by these companies to finance their operations and
investments is denominated in foreign currency. Lacking the
income to service their debt, many companies have been forced to
default.
These utility companies have been placed in a position that
will be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain in the medium- to
long-term range because the Public Emergency Law has forced
them to continue providing their services in accordance with their
obligations under the concession contracts. Electrical distribution
companies, for example, faced with dramatically reduced cash
flow, are forced to focus solely on the quality of their product and
services in the short term. As a result, they have suspended costly
investments on infrastructure that are critical to the optimal functioning of their networks over the long term. Despite the fact that
three years have elapsed since the enactment of the Public Emergency Law, the government has failed to renegotiate the concession contracts as required by such Law. 7 This series of events has
placed these companies in dire financial straits, while at the same
time compromising the integrity and quality of the public utility
services in Argentina.
15. Most contracts established that the initial tariff period would have a fixed
duration (e.g., 10 years), but would be subject to revision thereafter.
16. Law No. 25.561, Jan. 6, 2002, [LXII-A] A.D.L.A. 44.
17. Id.
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Given this situation and the perceived lack of prospects for a
satisfactory resolution to their predicament in the near future,
many of these companies have resorted to international arbitration in an effort to recover at least part of their damages. The
issue of whether Argentina could have achieved its policy goals
without targeting the public utilities in its Public Emergency Law
is relevant to the merits of the ICSID proceedings. This Article
does not seek to address that issue, which is mainly an economic
and political one, but rather seeks to identify the more noteworthy
legal issues that have arisen in the arbitral proceedings instituted
before ICSID.
The preceding detailed explanation of the background of the
Argentina claims is intended to facilitate an understanding of the
legal issues presented in the ICSID arbitrations, since many of
these issues relate directly to the nature of the investments made,
the context in which they were made, the guarantees the Argentine Government provided at the time of the investment, the
expectations of the investors coming into the country, the nature
of the economic crisis itself, and the justification for the measures
adopted by the Government in response thereto.
III.

PRINCIPAL LEGAL ISSUES IN THE ARGENTINA

ICSID CASES

The ICSID cases against Argentina present numerous legal
issues of interest, both in their jurisdictional and merits aspects.
This Section provides a brief description and analysis of such
issues, with a principal focus on the jurisdictional issues.
A.

JurisdictionalIssues

ICSID is a forum of limited jurisdiction. The jurisdictional
requirements are set forth in Article 25 of the Washington Convention."8 ICSID's jurisdiction extends only to a "legal dispute
18. See Washington Convention, supra note 3. Article 25 thereof provides:
(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of
another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute
consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties
have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally.
(2) "National of another Contracting State" means:
(a) Any natural person who had the nationality of a
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arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State
...and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties
to the dispute consent in writing to submit to [ICSID]."'19 The term
"national of another Contracting State" is defined, in the case of
juridical (as opposed to natural) persons, as a person who, on the
date of the parties' consent to arbitration, had the nationality of a
Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute."
When the arbitral claims are brought pursuant to a BIT, the
claimants must satisfy the jurisdictional requirements imposed by
both the BIT and the Washington Convention. Thus, to establish
that a particular BIT applies to a given dispute, the claimant
must prove that he or she qualifies as an "investor" under the BIT,
that he or she satisfies the nationality requirements of such
treaty, and that the dispute relates to an "investment" as defined
in the BIT. In some instances, there are also issues of temporal
application (e.g., whether the treaty applies retroactively).
In an ICSID arbitration, the Tribunal must suspend the merContracting State other than the State party to the dispute
on the date on which the parties consented to submit such
dispute to conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date
on which the request was registered pursuant to paragraph
(3) of Article 28 or paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does not
include any person who on either date also had the
nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute;
and
(b) Any juridical person which had the nationality of a
Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute
on the date on which the parties consented to submit such
dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical
person which had the nationality of the Contracting State
party to the dispute on that date and which, because of
foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as
a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of
this Convention.
(3) Consent by a constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
State shall require the approval of that State unless that State
notifies the Centre that no such approval is required.
(4) Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification,
acceptance or approval of this Convention or at any time
thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes
which it would or would not consider submitting to the
jurisdiction of the Centre. The Secretary-General shall
forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting States.
Such notification shall not constitute the consent required by
paragraph (1).
Id. at art. 25.
19. Id. at art. 25(1).
20. Id. at art. 25(2).
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its phase of a case if jurisdictional objections are raised. 1 The Tribunal can only resume the merits phase if it decides that
jurisdiction properly exists, or if it determines that it must also
hear the merits of the dispute to decide the issue of jurisdiction. 2
A joinder of the merits with jurisdiction could be decreed, for
example, where one or more jurisdictional issues are inextricably
linked to merits issues, such that the Tribunal concludes that it
cannot properly evaluate the former without understanding the
latter.
In each of its ICSID cases to date, Argentina has asserted
jurisdictional objections, as well as other objections that are not
"jurisdictional" in the formal sense of the term, but rather could be
characterized as "admissibility" or political issues. The more salient aspects of these objections and issues are addressed in the following subsections.
As of late 2004, there have been six jurisdictional rulings in
ICSID cases against Argentina: (1) CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of July 17, 2003); (2) Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (Decision on
Jurisdiction of Dec. 8, 2003); (3) Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 (Decision on Jurisdiction (Main
Claim) of Jan. 14, 2004); (4) Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 (Decision on Jurisdiction (Ancillary
Claim) of Aug. 2, 2004); and (5) Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 (Decision on Jurisdiction of Aug. 3,
2004); and (6) LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/1 (Decision on Jurisdiction of Apr. 30, 2004).23
All of these jurisdictional decisions have been adverse to Argentina, thus allowing the merits phase of each case to proceed.
1.

Applicable Law (Jurisdiction)
Article 42(1) of the Washington Convention provides:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with
such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the

21. Id. at art. 41(2). See also ICSID RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION
R. 41(3) (2003), available at http://www.worldbank.orgicsid/basicdoc/
partF-chap05.htm#r41 (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
22. Washington Convention, supra note 3, at art. 41(2).
23. The texts of all of these jurisdictional decisions can be found at: http://ita.law.
uvic.ca/chronological list.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2005). Additional details on each
of these cases, including their procedural status, can be obtained at the ICSID website
at: http://www.worldbank.orglicsid/cases/pending.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
PROCEEDINGS
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absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including
its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.2 4
Pointing to this provision and to BIT provisions that also make
reference to domestic law, Argentina has argued that Argentine
law should be the law applicable to the proceedings. The Siemens
Tribunal summarily rejected this argument on the basis that
"Argentina in its allegations has not distinguished between the
law applicable to the merits of the dispute and the law applicable
to determine the Tribunal's jurisdiction. This being an ICSID Tribunal, its jurisdiction is governed by Article 25 of the ICSID Convention 25 and the terms of the instrument expressing the parties'
consent to ICSID arbitration."26
Accordingly, the Siemens Tribunal ruled that Argentine law
was irrelevant to a determination on its jurisdiction. Other Tribunals have similarly concluded that the relevant ICSID Convention
and BIT provisions are unaffected by Argentine law, and that the
issue of which law is applicable to jurisdiction is governed by Article 25 of the ICSID Convention2 7 (and not by Article 42 of such
treaty,28 which is applicable only to the merits of the disputes).2 9
2.

Sovereign Prerogative/General Government Measures

During the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings, Argentina
has been raising, as a threshold matter, an argument that the
Tribunals have construed as relevant mainly to the merits. The
argument is that the measures complained of by the claimants,
which were adopted by the Argentine State in the context of a
serious economic crisis, were of a general nature that addressed
24. Washington Convention, supra note 3, at art. 42(1).
25. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
26. See Siemens A.G. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, T 31 (Decision on
Jurisdiction of Aug. 3, 2004). The "instrument expressing the terms of the parties'
consent" in the Siemens case was the relevant BIT.
27. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
28. For article 42(1), see text accompanying note 24. Article 42(2)-(3) provides:
(2) The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the
ground of silence or obscurity of the law.
(3) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not prejudice the
power of the Tribunal to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono if the
parties so agree.
Washington Convention, supra note 3, at art. 42(2)-(3).
29. See, e.g., Enron Corp. v. Arg.Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 38 (Decision
on Jurisdiction (Main Claim) of Jan. 14, 2004).
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economic problems and introduced changes to the currency
exchange system. Such policy decisions, Argentina contends,
should be viewed as inherently sovereign determinations immune
from legal challenges by any individual person or entity. It claims
that a State should have a right to revise its economic and currency exchange policy, without worrying about foreign investors
(or anyone else) asserting legal claims against it for attempting to
solve problems through the adoption of new policies. Further,
Argentina argues that investors cannot use BITs to seek redress
for adverse consequences they may suffer as a result of the particular economic policies of the State hosting the investment.
The CMS Tribunal was the first to pronounce itself on these
issues by stating in its jurisdictional decision of July 17, 2003:
[T]he Tribunal concludes.., that it does not have jurisdiction over measures of general economic policy adopted by
the Republic of Argentina and cannot pass judgment on
whether they are right or wrong. The Tribunal also concludes, however, that it has jurisdiction to examine
whether specific measures affecting the Claimant's investment or measures of general economic policy having a
direct bearing on such investment have been adopted in
violation of legally binding commitments made to the investor in treaties, legislation or contracts."
In a similar context, albeit related to tax policies and not to
economic emergency measures, the Enron Tribunal (Main Claim)
opined:
29. The Tribunal will not sit in judgment over the general
tax policies pursued by the Argentine Republic or the
Provinces.... This is a matter exclusively appurtenant
to the sovereignty of the Argentine Republic.
30. The Tribunal, however, has the duty to establish in
30. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, %33
(Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of July 17, 2003). Subsequent cases have
adopted a similar approach. See Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep.:
Although most of these aspects belong to the merits of the dispute,
the Tribunal is nonetheless aware of this emergency and takes due
note of it. At this stage, it is only appropriate to conclude ...

that

the Tribunal is not here to examine measures of general economic
policy or to judge whether they are right or wrong. Its duty is only
to examine in due course 'whether specific measures ...

have been

adopted in violation of legally binding commitments made to the
investor.'
Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 1 12 (Decision on Jurisdiction
(Ancillary Claim) of Aug. 2, 2004) (quoting CMS Gas Transmission Co., 33).
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connection with the merits of the case whether such
assessments violate the rights accorded to foreign
investors under treaties, legislation, contracts and
other commitments. 1
Accordingly, the Enron Tribunal (Main Claim) rejected
Argentina's invitation to dismiss the case as a threshold matter
based on sovereign prerogative. The Tribunal concluded that it
needed to consider that issue in the context of the merits:
The line separating general tax measures from measures
that affect the investor's rights is conceptually clear, but in
practice what falls within or without the Tribunal's competence can only be established in the light of the evidence
that the parties will produce in connection with the merits
of the case. 2
3.

Exclusive Jurisdiction and Waiver of other Fora
(Contract vs. Treaty Claims)

One of the principal issues in cases that involve claims by foreign companies that invested in Argentine companies to which
concessions had been granted by the State (e.g., to provide public
utility services), or with which the State has other types of contracts, has been whether (1) the dispute should be construed to
involve only a violation of the relevant contract (which, in those
instances where the contract contains an exclusive jurisdiction
clause pursuant to which the parties waive recourse to all other
fora, would arguably render such dispute subject to resolution
only in local Argentine courts), or whether (2) the dispute involves
damages suffered by the foreign investor itself pursuant to the relevant BIT (not the concession contract), thereby engendering a
cause of action under the BIT and rendering the dispute cognizable by an international arbitral tribunal.
The Tribunals in the Argentina cases have consistently ruled
that foreign investors' rights under the BITs are independent and
separate from those enjoyed under any contract with the State,
and that the BITs allow causes of action that are unrelated to
those that may arise under any contract. In other words, certain
Government acts can violate an investor's BIT rights whether or
not such acts violate an existing contract, and if so, the affected
31. Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/0113, T% 29-30 (Decision on
Jurisdiction (Main Claim) of Jan. 14, 2004).
32. Id. % 31.
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investor can assert a claim under the BIT and is not bound by any
exclusive jurisdiction clause that may exist in the relevant contract.3 As noted in the Enron Tribunal (ancillary claim) decision:
The distinction between these different types of claims [i.e.,
contract and treaty claims] has relied in part on the test of
the triple identity. To the extent that a dispute might
involve the same parties, object and cause of action it might
be considered as a dispute where it is virtually impossible
to separate the contract issues from the treaty issues and
drawing from that distinction any jurisdictional conclusions ... However, 'a treaty cause of action is not the same

as a contractual cause of action; it requires a clear showing
of conduct which is in the circumstances contrary to the relevant treaty standard.'34
Moreover, the foreign investor in the Argentina claims typically is not itself a party to the relevant contract; rather, the foreign investor usually owns stock in a local company created by the
Argentine Government for the purpose of conferring upon it the
relevant concession or license. Thus, this lack of party identity
renders the BIT claims distinguishable from the contract claims,
and the investor therefore cannot be held bound to any waiver of
jurisdiction clause that may be contained in the contract.35 A few
of the Tribunals also have noted that under Article 26 of the
Washington Convention, consent to ICSID jurisdiction excludes
33. See Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Rep.:
The investment dispute which the Claimant has put before this
Tribunal invokes obligations owed by the Respondent [State] to
Claimant under the BIT and it is based on a different cause of
action from a claim under the Contract Documents. Even if the
dispute as presented by the Claimant may involve the
interpretation or analysis of facts related to performance under the
Concession Agreement, the Tribunal considers that, to the extent
that such issues are relevant to a breach of the obligations of the
Respondent under the BIT, they cannot per se transform the
dispute under the BIT into a contractual dispute.
Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 76 (Decision on Jurisdiction
of Dec. 8, 2003).
34. Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
49-50 (Decision on
Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) of Aug. 2, 2004) (quoting Compaftia de Aguas del
Aconquija, S.A. v. Arg. Rep.: ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
113 (Decision on
Annulment of July 3, 2002)). See also Siemens A.G. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/8,
180 (Decision on Jurisdiction of Aug. 3, 2004).
35. See Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Rep.: "In the dispute before the present Tribunal...
the State is not a party to any of the Contract Documents, and there was no waiver
commitment made by the Claimant in favor of Argentina." Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Rep.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
85 (Decision on Jurisdiction of Dec. 8, 2003).
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any other remedy.3 6 Thus, "the offer made by the Argentine
Republic to covered investors under the ARGENTINA - U.S. [BIT]
cannot be diminished by the submission to Argentina's domestic
courts, to which the Concession Agreement remits."3 7
A long string of ICSID Tribunals have confronted the Respondent State's arguments that the claimant should be barred from
asserting claims under a BIT because of allegedly applicable
forum selection clauses in a contract. No Tribunal has upheld this
argument, even when a concurrent violation of the BIT and the
contract could be deemed to have existed. As stated by the Enron
Tribunal (Main Claim):
The Tribunal is mindful of the various ICSID decisions that
have recently discussed this very issue, particularly those
in Lanco, Comparzia Aguas del Aconquija (Award and
Annulment), Wena, CMS, and Salini. In all of these cases
the Tribunals have upheld jurisdiction under the Convention to address violations of contracts which, at the same
time, constitute a breach of the pertinent bilateral investment treaty. 9

4. Ius Standi and Related Issues
In those cases in which the claimant's investment consisted of
shares of stock in an Argentine company, Argentina has advanced
arguments revolving around the nature of the investment and the
status of the claimant. Argentina has raised these points in the
jurisdictional phase, but has styled them as points of admissibility
rather than jurisdiction.
36. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 72
(Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of July 17, 2003).
37. Id. T 73 (quoting Lanco Int'l, Inc. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, 1 40
(Preliminary Decision of the ICSID Tribunal of Dec. 8, 1998).
38. Lanco Int'l, Inc. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6 (Preliminary Decision
of the ICSID Tribunal of Dec. 8, 1998); Compafiia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and
Vivendi Universal v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 (Award of Nov. 21, 2000);
Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Rep. of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4 (Award of Dec. 8,
2000); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 9133
(Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of July 17, 2003); Salini Construttori S.p.A. v.
Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 (Decision on Jurisdiction of July 23,

2001).
91 (Decision on
39. Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Jurisdiction (Main Claim) of Jan. 14, 2004). See also LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg.
Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, T160-66 (Decision Pending); CMS Gas Transmission
Co. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, TT1 68, 76 (Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction of July 17, 2003); Compafiia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi
Universal v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 9153 (Award of Nov. 21, 2000).
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One of the principal arguments in this regard is that only the
company that suffered the damage, and not its shareholders, can
seek redress for such damage. In other words, shareholders cannot make separate claims from the corporation that suffered the
damage, not even in proportion to their interest, because they
would have only an indirect claim and therefore lack standing to
file ICSID claims. Only the Argentine company itself - and not its
shareholders individually - suffered damages, and accordingly,
Argentina reasons, only the company is entitled to seek damages.
Argentina does not contend that shares of corporate stock are necessarily outside the scope of the BITs; rather, its position is that to
assert such a claim, such stock must suffer direct consequences of
the State action deemed to have violated the BIT. Under this conception, a direct expropriation of the shares would be actionable
by the foreign shareholders under the applicable BITs, but such
shareholders could not advance claims for general damages suffered by the company.4 °
In support of this argument, Argentina has contended, inter
alia, the following: (1) Argentine law establishes that shareholders and corporations have a distinct legal personality and does not
allow shareholders to file claims for indirect damages; thus, only
the company that suffered the damage can bring claims; (2) international law also recognizes this distinct personality and precludes shareholder claims for indirect damages; (3) allowing these
indirect claims could subject respondent States to endless claims
by different shareholders suing independently of the corporation
that suffered the damage, thereby creating a multiplicity of both
claims and awards for the same facts and rights; and (4) allowing
indirect claims-particularly where the investor does not have
control of the relevant company-would enable litigation by holders of an attenuated and remote shareholder interest (for example, a company that owns shares of another company that has
shares in an Argentine licensee or concessionaire).4 ' In addition,
Argentina argues that minority shareholders should not be
allowed to assert claims because this approach would expose
States to multiple claims by different minority shareholders suing
in their own right under different treaties.42
40. See Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
35 (Decision on
Jurisdiction (Main Claim) of Jan. 14, 2004).
41. See Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
42-43, 45
(Decision on Jurisdiction of Dec. 8, 2003).
42. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 8
(Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of July 17, 2003).
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The Claimants have countered that the BIT specifically and
expressly allows investors to bring claims in relation to their
investments, and nothing in international law prevents them from
doing so. Thus, the claimants contend that their claims are independent of any claim that the companies (for example, the licensees or concessionaires in the public utilities) in which the
claimants are shareholders might have as the holders of the
licenses or concession rights. Moreover, they contend that
whether the claimant is merely a minority shareholder or otherwise lacks control over the company is irrelevant.4 3
This argument has resulted in debate between the parties
and by the Tribunals on two cases decided by the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"), Barcelona Traction" and ELSI,45 which
addressed the extent of the right of a State to grant diplomatic
protection to nationals of that State who are shareholders in foreign companies. The Tribunals in the Argentina cases, however,
found that debate misplaced and irrelevant.4 " The Siemens tribunal noted furthermore that ICSID case law has consistently
affirmed a shareholder's right to bring a claim before arbitral
tribunals.4 7 ICJ jurisprudence has also evolved in this direction,
prompting the CMS tribunal to note that, "the Elettronica Sicula
decision evidences that the International Court of Justice itself
accepted, some years later, the protection of shareholders of a corporation by the State of their nationality in spite of the fact that
the affected corporation had a corporate personality under the
defendant State's legislation."48
43. Id. 62.
44. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 5).
45. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J 15 (July 20).
46. See Siemens A.G. v. Arg. Rep.: "The Tribunal considers it unnecessary to
discuss the relevance of these cases to the current proceedings. The issues before this
Tribunal concern not diplomatic protection under customary international law but
the rights of investors, including shareholders, as determined by the [BIT]." Siemens
A.G. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, T 141 (Decision on Jurisdiction of Aug. 3,
2004). See also Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 38 (Decision on
Jurisdiction (Main Claim) of Jan. 14, 2004) (concluding that Barcelona Traction is
"not controlling in investment claims, as it deals with the separate question of
diplomatic protection in a particular setting."); Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Rep.: "The
Tribunal does not find it necessary to resolve the controversy regarding the extent of
the right of a State under public international law to protect its nationals who are
shareholders in foreign companies." Azurix Corp. v. Arg.Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/
01/12, 72 (Decision on Jurisdiction of Dec. 8, 2003).
47. See Siemens A.G. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 142 (Decision on
Jurisdiction of Aug. 3, 2004).
48. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg.Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 44
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Argentina also has pointed to the NAFTA decision in Mondev
v. USA, 49 in which the Tribunal concluded that shareholders cannot assert claims under NAFTA for damages suffered by the company in which they own shares. However, as the Enron (Ancillary
Claim) decision pointed out, Mondev does not support Argentina's
argument because in Mondev the Claimant was nevertheless
deemed to have standing, to show "that it ha[d] suffered loss or
damage ...even if loss or damage was also suffered by the enter-

prise [in which Mondev had invested].""
In the jurisdictional decisions rendered as of late 2004 in the
Argentina cases, the Tribunals have rejected Argentina's arguments on the indirect or minority ownership issues. Their rejections primarily were based on the definition of "investments" in
the BITs, which specifically includes shares of stock to protect foreign investors in local companies, and on the fact that there is no
limitation that bars application of the BIT to this type of claimant,
even if the claimant's damages are only indirect and even if the
claimant is merely a minority shareholder:
Claimants have ius standi to claim in their own right as
they are protected investors under the Treaty [i.e., the
BIT]. The Claimants' right to bring an action on their own
has been firmly established in the Treaty and there are no
reasons to hold otherwise in connection with this dispute.
Neither is this situation contrary to international law or to
ICSID practice and decisions."s
As the Siemens Tribunal noted, "The [BIT] does not require
that there be no interposed companies between the investment
and the ultimate owner of the company. Therefore, a literal reading of the Treaty does not support the allegation that the definition of investment excludes indirect investments."" The Tribunal
found further support for this proposition in the broad definition
of the term "investment" in the BIT and in the lack of any explicit
distinction between direct or indirect investment. 3
(Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of July 17, 2003) (citing ELETTRONICA SICuLA
S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. ITALY), 1989 I.C.J 15).
49. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (Award
Rendered Oct. 11, 2002).
50. Id. 82.
51. Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
27 (Decision on
Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) of Aug. 2, 2004).
52. Siemens A.G. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8,
137 (Decision on
Jurisdiction of Aug. 3, 2004).
53. Id.
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Along similar lines, the Enron (Ancillary Claim) Tribunal
noted:
Foreign investors, such as the Claimants, were specifically
invited to participate in the privatization process, various
companies were set up in Argentina to this effect and
investments were channeled into TGS [i.e., the Argentine
company whose shares the Claimants purchased] through
this network of corporate arrangements. It is simply not
tenable to try now to dissociate TGS from those other companies and the investors and argue that the Claimants do
not have ius standi. This is one of the essential features of
the [BIT] and the protection it extends to foreign
investors.54
The mechanism established to transfer the rights to operate the
utilities to private sector companies contemplated the mandatory
creation by the State of a local company that would serve as a
concessionaire or licensee, and the sale of such company's shares
in a public bidding process in which only locally incorporated holding companies could participate as a vehicle for foreign companies'
investment. On this point, the Enron (Ancillary Claim) Tribunal
stressed that the definition of "investment" under the U.S. Argentina BIT "evidently includes the channeling of investments
through locally incorporated companies, particularly when this is
mandated by the very legal arrangements governing the privatization process in Argentina. Not only was it required that TGS
be an Argentine company but also that the holding companies
should be incorporated in Argentina."5 5 Moreover, as the LG&E
Tribunal noted, Argentina's own investment law (Law No. 21.382)
defines "foreign investment" to include "the acquisition of shares
of capital in an existing local company by foreign investors." 6 The
Tribunal concluded that the protection of the BIT extends to
minority shareholders and there is nothing in international law
precluding claims under a BIT by such shareholders.57
The Enron Tribunal addressed Argentina's argument that if
28 (Decision on
54. Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) of Aug. 2, 2004).
55. Id. 30.
56. LG&E v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 55 (Decision on Jurisdiction
of Apr. 30, 2004).
57. See, e.g., Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 9 29 (Decision
on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) of Aug. 2, 2004) ("[It is irrelevant whether the
shares are majority or minority shares."); see also Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID
Case No. ARB/0113, $ 38 (Decision on Jurisdiction (Main Claim) of Jan. 14, 2004)
("[Tihe rights of minority and non-controlling shareholders to claim independently of
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indirect investors are allowed to make a claim, an endless chain of
claims could be triggered because claims could be asserted by anyone with shares in some company that directly or indirectly owns
shares in another company that suffers damages as a result of
actions by the State hosting the investment. In this regard, the
Enron (Main Claim) Tribunal admitted that "there is indeed a
need to establish a cut-off point beyond which claims would not be
permissible as they would have only a remote connection to the
affected company."58 The Tribunal went on to identify that cutoff
point as related to the extent of the host State's consent to arbitration: "If consent has been given in respect of an investor and an
investment, it can reasonably be concluded that the claims
brought by such investor are admissible under the treaty.

'59

Oth-

erwise, such claims must be deemed "inadmissible as being only
remotely connected with the affected company and the scope of the
legal system protecting the investment.""
Finally, in connection with the issue of indirect investors and
indirect damages, the Washington Convention's requirement that
a claim must "arise directly out of an investment" has been
deemed irrelevant to the analysis, insofar as such requirement
does not relate to whether or not the investment is direct or indirect but rather to whether there is a direct connection between the
dispute and the investment.61
B.

Merits Issues

As noted earlier, no Tribunal in the Argentina cases has ruled
on the merits as of late 2004. The first such ruling is expected at
the earliest in early to mid-2005. A very brief description set forth
a separate corporate entity for the measures that affect their investment ... ha[ve]
been upheld both under international law and the ICSID Convention.").
58. Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
52 (Decision on
Jurisdiction (Main Claim) of Jan. 14, 2004).
59. Id.
60. Id. Similarly, in its Ancillary Claim decision, the Enron Tribunal stated,
Argentina is rightly concerned about the fact that successive claims
by minority shareholders that invest in companies that in turn
invest in other companies, could end up with claims that are only
remotely connected to the measures questioned. However, ...
there is a clear limit to this chain in so far as the consent to the
arbitration clause is only related to specific investors.
Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
20 (Decision on Jurisdiction
(Ancillary Claim) of Aug. 2, 2004).
61. See Siemens A.G. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8,
149-50 (Decision
on Jurisdiction of Aug. 3, 2004); See also Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, H 59-60 (Decision on Jurisdiction of Jan. 14, 2004).
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below highlights some of the key issues the Tribunals in these
cases are likely to face in the merits phase of the proceedings.
1.

Interpretation of BIT "umbrella clauses"

Many BITs have so-called "umbrella clauses" that obligate the
Contracting States to comply with any specific agreement or contract they may have entered into (e.g., an investment contract)
with a foreign investor. For example, Article 7(2) of the BIT
between Argentina and Chile states as follows: "Each Contracting
State shall comply with any commitment it may have undertaken
in connection with the investments in its territory of nationals or
62
companies of the other Contracting State."
One of the central issues with these clauses is whether they
can be construed to elevate to the status of a BIT violation any
violation of a commitment by the host State with respect to the
investment. For example, if the host State enters into an investment contract with the foreign investor, can the "umbrella clause"
of the BIT be interpreted to mean that any failure by the host
State to fulfill its commitments under such contract constitutes, a
fortiori, a BIT violation? The scope and legal significance of this
type of clause has been widely debated in recent ICSID jurisprudence, with disparate conclusions. The issue also is likely to be
addressed in the merits phase of many of the Argentina cases.
2.

Expropriation

One central contention in the Argentina ICSID claims concerns alleged violations of expropriation clauses in the BITs.6 In
62. Tratado Entre la Repfiblica de Chile y la Repdblica de Argentina Sobre
Promoci6n y Protecci6n Recfproca de Inversiones [Bilateral Investment Treaty
between Argentina and Chile], Aug. 2, 1991, Arg. - Chile, art. 7(2) (entered into force
Jan. 1, 1995), available at http://www.nycas.cl/appi.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2004).
63. Compare SGS Soci~t6 G~n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Rep. of the Philippines,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of Jan. 29, 2004)
with SGS Socidtd G~n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Rep. of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/13 (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of Aug. 6, 2003).
64. An example of a BIT provision granting foreign investors protections against
expropriation or nationalization without adequate compensation is that contained in
Article IV of the BIT between Argentina and Finland, signed Nov. 5, 1993:
(1) Neither Contracting Party shall take, directly or indirectly, any
measure of nationalization or expropriation or any other
measure having the same effect against investments in its
territory belonging to investors of the other Contracting Party,
unless the following conditions are complied with:
(a) the measures are taken in the public interest and under due
process of law; and
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the claims relating to the Public Emergency Law, the Tribunals
must address various questions: Was there an expropriation? If
so, what kind of expropriation? Is the relevant conduct by Argentina subject to some exemption or excuse?

(b) the measures are not discriminatory; and
(c) the measures are accompanied by provisions for the
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
(2) Compensation for cases referred to in paragraph (1) of this
Article shall amount to the market value of the expropriated
investment at the time immediately before the expropriation or
before the impending expropriation became public knowledge.
The compensation shall include interest at a commercial rate
established on a market basis from the date of expropriation
until the date of payment, shall be paid without delay and shall
be effectively realizable.
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government
of the Republic of Argentina on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, availableat http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentinafinland.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2004). As another example:
1. Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either
directly or indirectly through measures tantamount in their
consequences to expropriation or nationalization
("expropriation") except: for a public purpose; in a
nondiscriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate
and effective compensation; and in accordance with due process
of law and the general principles of treatment provided for in
Article II (2). Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair
market value of the expropriated investment immediately before
the expropriatory action was taken or became known, whichever
is earlier; be paid without delay; include interest at a
commercially reasonable rate from the date of expropriation; be
fully realizable; and be freely transferable at the prevailing
market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.
2. A national or company of either Party that asserts that all or
part of its investment has been expropriated shall have a right
to prompt review by the appropriate judicial or administrative
authorities of the other Party to determine whether any such
expropriation has occurred and, if so, whether such
expropriation, and any compensation therefore, conforms to the
principles of international law.
3. Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments suffer
losses in the territory of the other Party owing to war or other
armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency,
insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar events shall be
accorded nondiscriminatory treatment by such other Party as
regards any measures it adopts in relation to such losses.
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
Sept. 23, 1992, U.S. - Bulg., art. III, available at http:/www.usembassy.bg/rela/invest.
html (last visited Dec. 17, 2004).
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Indirect Expropriation

Many claimants in the Argentina cases are asserting claims
of "indirect expropriation." Most BITs allow these claims under
clauses referring to measures "equivalent to" or "tantamount to"
expropriation. 5 The concept of indirect expropriation has been
defined in various ways. For example, the Tribunal in Metalclad
v. Mexico defined it as follows:
[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open,
deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as
outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in
favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the
use or reasonably-to-beexpected economic benefit of property
even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host
State.6

The Tribunal in TECMED v. Mexico noted that there is no "clear
or unequivocal definition" of the concept, while observing that, "it
is generally understood that [indirect expropriation] materialize[s] through actions or conduct, which do not explicitly express
the purpose of depriving one of rights or assets, but actually have
that effect."67
65. Id.
66. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
103 (Award of Aug. 30, 2001) (emphasis added).
67. Thcnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2), 114 (Award rendered on May 29, 2003). See also RUDOLF
DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 100 (1995) ("In
determining whether a taking constitutes an 'indirect expropriation,' it is particularly
important to examine the effect that such taking may have had on the investor's
rights. Where the effect is similar to what might have occurred under an outright
expropriation, the investor could in all likelihood be covered under most BIT
provisions."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712 cmt. g (1986)
("A state is responsible for [a foreign] expropriation of property ... when it subjects
alien property to taxation, regulation, or other action that is confiscatory, or that
prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or unduly delays, effective enjoyment of an
alien's property...."; Middle E. Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Rep.
of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, 107 (Award rendered on Apr. 12, 2002) ("When
measures are taken by a State the effect of which is to deprive the investor of the use
and benefit of this investment even though he may retain nominal ownership of the
respective rights being the investment, the measures are often referred to as a
'creeping' or 'indirect' expropriation, or, as in the BIT, as measures 'the effect of which
is tantamount to expropriation."').

For sources discussing indirect expropriation, see generally Rudolf Dolzer,
Indirect Expropriationof Alien Property, 1 ICSID REVIEW: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J.
41 (1986); DOLZER & STEVENS, supra, at 98-100; Maurizio Brunetti, The Iran-United
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The ICSID Tribunals in the Argentina cases relating to the
emergency measures therefore must decide whether such measures deprived foreign investors of reasonably expected investment benefits or had an effect on the investments such that the
measures constituted an "indirect expropriation."
b.

Defense of Necessity/Emergency

In connection with the expropriation arguments, and more
generally with the other claims, a key issue is whether the Argentine State's relevant conduct was excusable based on notions of
"necessity" or "emergency." What was the nature of such necessity or emergency? Did the circumstances warrant exempting
Argentina from its BIT obligations? What is the meaning of
"emergency" as that term is utilized in the BITs, and does it apply
to emergencies of an economic (as opposed to a politico-military)
nature? If so, how are such emergencies defined? Are they
assessed under an objective standard (which would be subject to
evaluation and determination by an ICSID Tribunal), or under a
subjective one (which would be subject only to the discretion of the
host State)? In other words, are such clauses "self-judging"? If
these emergency clauses are applicable to economic emergencies and especially if the relevant standard is self-judging - what are
the general implications for BIT practice and implementation?
In its recent ICSID cases, Argentina reportedly is invoking
the argument that, due to the severe economic emergency it faced
in 2001-2002, it was left with no choice but to adopt the measures
it did. 6

The argument presumably relies on concepts such as

"impossibility of performance" or "fundamental change of circumstances," as set forth in Articles 61 and 62, respectively, of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.69
The concept of changed circumstances is known in internaStates Claims Tribunal, NAFTA

Chapter 11, and the Doctrine of Indirect

Expropriation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 203 (2001).

68. "Balance del juicio en Paris - Rosatti: 'El submarino diesel enfrent6 a los
nucleares'- El Ministrode Justiciahabl6 con La Naci6n antes de regresar,"LA NACION
(Buenos Aires), Aug. 21, 2004, at HTrp://WWW.JUS.GOV.AR/PRENSA/ARTICULOS/CIADI/
21-8-04%20LN.PDF (last visited November 7, 2004).
69. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 61-62, 1155
U.N.T.S. 346-47.
Article 61. Supervening Impossibility of Performance:
1. A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the
impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or
destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the
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tional law as rebus sic stantibus. For the change in circumstance
to excuse a party from a treaty obligation, it must be a radical one.
In the Fisheries Jurisdictioncase, the ICJ stated: "International
law admits that a fundamental change in the circumstances which
determined the parties to accept a treaty, if it has resulted in a
radical transformation of the extent of the obligations imposed by
it, may, under certain conditions, afford the party affected a
ground for invoking the termination or suspension of the treaty.""
The ICJ referred to Article 62 of the Vienna Convention and
stated: "One of the basic requirements embodied in that Article is
that the change of circumstances must have been a fundamental
one."71 Elaborating further, the Court went on to observe that the
changes of circumstances that "must be regarded as fundamental
or vital are those which imperil the existence or vital development
of one of the parties."72 In light of these stringent standards, it is
very rare for international tribunals to grant relief to a treaty
Party on the basis of rebus sic stantibus.
The doctrine of force majeure also could be relevant. In its
Articles of State Responsibility, the International Law Commission ("ILC") delineated the doctrine as follows:
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with
an international obligation of that State is precluded if the
act is due to force majeure, that is the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control
of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.73
treaty. If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only

as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.
Article 62. Fundamental Change of Circumstances:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred
with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a
treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the
treaty unless:
(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by
the treaty; and
(b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the extent
of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
70. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, j 36 (Judgment on
Jurisdiction of Feb. 2, 1973).
71. Id. at 37.
72. Id. at 38.
73. G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at art. 23, U.N. Doc. A/
56/589 (2001).
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However, the ILC cautions in its Articles of State Responsibility that the doctrine does not apply in either of the following
circumstances:
(a) The situation of force majeure is due, either alone or in
combination with other factors, to the conduct of the
State invoking it; or
(b) The State has assumed the risk of that situation
occurring.74
The other concept that could be debated in the Argentina cases is
that of "necessity," on which the ILC commented in its Articles of
State Responsibility as follows:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity
with an international obligation of that State unless the
act:
a. Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and
b. Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the
State or States towards which the obligation exists,
or of the international community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding wrongfulness if:
a. The international obligation in question excludes the
possibility of invoking necessity; or
b. The State75 has contributed to the situation of
necessity.

Aside from the foregoing general principles and concepts of
international law, Argentina is reportedly invoking in the ICSID
arbitrations a provision in its BITs that is fairly common not only
in the Argentine BITs but also in those of other countries, which
creates a special exception to the expropriation standards for foreign investors in certain circumstances of "emergency." For example, Article IV(3) of the BIT between Argentina and the United
States provides:
Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments
suffer losses in the territory of the other Party owing to war
or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar
events shall be accorded treatment by such other Party no
less favorable than that accorded to its own nationals or
74. Id. at art. 23, para. 2.
75. Id. at art. 25.
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companies or to nationals or companies of any third country, whichever is the more favorable treatment, as regards
any measures it adopts in relation to such losses.76
One of the main issues the ICSID Tribunals will need to
decide in connection with the applicability of these BIT clauses to
the Argentine emergency of early 2002 is whether such clauses
were intended to cover economic emergencies (as opposed to politico-military ones). A reasonable argument can be made that,
under the ejusdem generis rule of construction, treaty negotiators
did not so intend, since the clauses appear to address only confrontations, upheavals, or strife of a violent or military nature. Moreover, given the relative frequency of economic crises in capitalimporting states, creating a BIT exception for economic emergencies could circumscribe the scope of such treaties in a way that
renders their applicability largely unpredictable for investors,
thereby thwarting one of the principal purposes of these
instruments.
3.

Fair & Equitable Treatment

Most BITs impose obligations on the Parties to provide "fair
and equitable treatment" to investors of the other Party.77 However, the relevant clauses typically do not delineate clearly that
concept, or what types of conduct are encompassed by it. The
ICSID Tribunals thus have been left to determine the matter on a
case-by-case basis. The Tribunal in the recent case of Tecmed v.
Mexico expressed the following views on the subject:
76. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, U.S. - Arg., art. IV, 3, 1991 U.S.T. LEXIS 176, at 19.
77. An example of a BIT provision granting foreign investors guarantees of fair
and equitable treatment is that contained in the BIT between Argentina and the
Netherlands, at Article 3(1): "Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable
treatment to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party .

. . ."

See also

Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Aug.
3, 1984, U.S. - Congo, art. II, 4, 1984 U.S.T. LEXIS 246, at 25-26:
Investments of nationals and companies of either Party shall at all
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy
protection and security in the territory of the other Party. The
treatment, protection and security of investment shall be in
accordance with applicable national laws, and may not be less than
that recognized by international law. Neither Party shall in any
way impair by arbitrary and discriminatory measures the
management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition,
expansion, or disposal of investment made by nationals or
companies of the other Party. Each Party shall observe any
obligation it may have entered into with regard to investment of
nationals or companies of the other Party.
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153. The Arbitral Tribunal finds that the commitment of
fair and equitable treatment included in [the BIT] is
an expression and part of the bona fide principle recognized in international law, although bad faith from
the State is not required for its violation:
To the modern eye, what is unfair or inequitable need
not equate with the outrageous or the egregious. In
particular, a State may treat foreign investment
unfairly and inequitably without necessarily acting in
bad faith. [citation omitted]
154. The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of
the Agreement, in light of the good faith principle
established by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign
investor expects the host State to act in a consistent
manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that
it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the
goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment
and comply with such regulations. Any and all State
actions conforming to such criteria should relate not
only to the guidelines, directives or requirements
issued, or the resolutions approved thereunder, but
also to the goals underlying such regulations."
The Tribunal further explained:
The foreign investor also expects the host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting
decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied
upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as
to plan and launch its commercial and business activities.
The investor also expects the State to use the legal instruments that govern the actions of the investor or the invest78. T~cnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. the United Mexican States,
153-54 (Award Rendered on May 29, 2003) (citing
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2,
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 19 (5th ed. 1989)). The
TECMED Tribunal also noted, "it is understood that the fair and equitable treatment
principle included in international agreements for the protection of foreign
investments expresses 'the international law requirements of due process, economic

rights, obligations of good faith and natural justice."' Id. at n.189 (quoting S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Gov't of Can., 2004 FC 38,

29 (Judgment Awarded on Jan. 13, 2004)).
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ment in conformity with the function usually assigned to
such instruments, and not to deprive the investor of its
investment without the required compensation. In fact,
failure by the host State to comply with such pattern of conduct with respect to the foreign investor or its investments
affects the investor's ability to measure the treatment and
protection awarded by the host State and to determine
whether the actions of the host State conform to the fair
and equitable treatment principle. Therefore, compliance
by the host State with such pattern of conduct is closely
related to the above-mentioned principle, to the actual
chances of enforcing such principle, and to excluding the
possibility that state action be characterized as arbitrary;
i.e. as presenting insufficiencies that would be recognized
"... by any reasonable and impartial man," or, although not

in violation of specific regulations, as being contrary to the
law because: ... [it] shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of

juridical propriety. v9
For its part, the Tribunal in CME Czech Republic B.V. v.
Czech Republic described the standard as follows:
Whether conduct is fair and equitable depends on the factual context of the State's actions, including factors such as
the undertakings made to the investor and the actions the
investor took in reliance on those undertakings. This
requirement can thus prohibit conduct that might be permissible in some circumstances but appears unfair and
inequitable in the context of a particular dispute."0
The Argentine emergency measures will need to be evaluated
by the ICSID tribunals in the Argentina cases in light of the jurisprudence. Was it necessary for the State to adopt the particular
measures that it did? What were its justifications? Was there an
adequate relation between the means used and the intended
goals? Or was the severity of the measures disproportionate to
the objectives sought? Could the measures be characterized as
arbitrary, unfair, or capricious? Could alternative measures have
been adopted with a less harmful result to the foreign investors?
Did the measures thwart the investors' reasonable expectations,
or vitiate conditions upon which the investors reasonably relied?
79. T6cnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2,
154 (Award Rendered on May 29, 2003) (internal citations omitted).
80. CME Czech Rep. B.V. v. Czech Rep., UNCITRAL,
157 (Partial Award
Rendered on Sept. 13, 2001).
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Discrimination & National Treatment; Most-FavoredNation Treatment

The BITs typically contain provisions prohibiting discrimination against investors of the other State Party, and guaranteeing
treatment of such investors at least as favorable as that of the
host State's own nationals and those of other States. 1 The debate
concerning claims based on discriminatory treatment in the
Argentina cases will likely revolve around whether these measures affected all investors equally. Argentina can be expected to
argue that the laws and regulations were drafted to apply to everyone equally, irrespective of nationality. However, the Claimants that invested in the public utilities sector can contend that
their sector was unfairly singled out in the Public Emergency
Law. Specifically, they can be expected to argue that the "pesification" and freezing of the tariffs were discriminatory measures
insofar as there were concessions in other sectors in which dollarbased rates were not "pesified" or frozen, and that the public utili81. An example of a BIT provision granting foreign investors protections against
discrimination is that contained in Article II(2)(b) of the BIT between Argentina and
the United States:
Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or
discriminatory measures the management, operation,
maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of
investments. For the purposes of dispute resolution under Articles
VII and VIII, a measure may be arbitrary or discriminatory
notwithstanding the opportunity to review such measure in the
courts or administrative tribunals of a Party.
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Nov.
14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., art. II, i 2(b), 1991 U.S.T. LEXIS 176 at 15-16.
An example of a BIT provision guaranteeing to foreign investors and their
investments treatment no less favorable than that accorded to national investors or
those of third party states is that contained in Article 3 of the BIT between the United
Kingdom and Chile, which states in relevant part as follows:
1) Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject
investments or returns of investors of the other Contracting
Party to treatment less favourable than that which it accords to
investments or returns of its own investors or to investments or
returns of investors of any third State.
2) Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investors
of the other Contracting Party, as regards their management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, to
treatment less favourable than that which it accords to its own
investors or to investors of any third State.
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Chile and the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Jan. 8, 1996 (entered into force June 23, 1997), available at
http://www.cinver.cl (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).
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ties sector is disproportionately foreign-controlled as compared to
other sectors of the Argentine economy.
The relatively novel aspect of this last argument is that the
investors would not be claiming that they individually suffered
discrimination vis-A-vis individual investors of Argentine or some
other particular nationality or nationalities, but rather, that a
whole sector of the economy - comprised of investors of various
nationalities - was discriminated against in comparison to other
sectors that were controlled to a greater degree by Argentine
investors.
IV.

ISSUES OF ENFORCEABILITY SHOULD

CLAIMANTS PREVAIL

One of the principal advantages of ICSID arbitration is that
enforcement of ICSID awards is swifter and relatively less complicated than that of other types of international arbitral awards
(and even swifter and less complicated than the enforcement of
domestic court judgments). This is so because pursuant to the
Washington Convention:
(1) Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and
enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. s2
Thus, a claimant may seek enforcement of an ICSID award in
the territory of any State Party to the Washington Convention in
which assets of the respondent State may be found, and such state
must enforce the award as if it were a ruling of the highest court
of the State in which enforcement is sought.8 3 Enforcing an ICSID
award does not require initiation of proceedings under the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"), 4 since the relevant rules are contained in the Washington Convention.8 5 In the
82. Washington Convention, supra, note 3, at art. 54(1).
83. Id.
84. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
("New York Convention"), June 10, 1958, 7 I.L.M. 1042 (entered into force on June 7,
1959).
85. Note that the execution of any ICSID award remains subject to the relevant
rules of immunity under the legislation of the State where execution is sought.
However, many States have special exceptions to immunity for the enforcement of
international arbitral awards. See, e.g., United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (1976) (as amended).
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Argentina cases, the limitations on enforcement abroad of any
award favorable to the claimants will likely stem -at least in the
short run- from solvency problems and the ability of claimants to
find assets against which they can execute their judgments.
One of the places where Argentine assets could be found for
satisfaction of ICSID judgments favorable to the claimants is naturally Argentina itself. Argentine courts, like those of any other
State Party to the Washington Convention, would be bound under
that treaty to honor the award as if it were a final ruling in Argentina's own judicial system. However, Argentine executive branch
authorities have already indicated to the press that any attempt
to enforce an ICSID award within Argentina will likely be challenged on constitutional grounds in Argentine courts.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The welter of Argentina claims is the first in ICSID history
filed by separate claimants against a single country in connection
with an economic crisis. The Argentina cases have dramatically
increased the number of pending claims before ICSID (thirty-five
of the eighty-five pending claims as of this writing are against
Argentina),86 thereby placing a great strain on ICSID's resources
as an arbitral institution. Furthermore, it is expected that additional claims against Argentina will be filed in upcoming months.
Perhaps more important than the budgetary and resource
concerns are the implications of these cases on ICSID as an arbitral institution. The first ruling on the merits (likely in the CMS
case) is expected to substantially influence subsequent awards in
the Argentina cases. However, since there is no rule of stare decisis in international arbitration, it is at least conceivable that
Tribunals in later cases will rule differently on identical or similar
fact patterns. Even though multiple claimants can assert joint
claims against a state under the current ICSID system (assuming
each of them meets the applicable jurisdictional requirements),
and such claim consolidation would have the advantage of producing a single arbitral interpretation of - and pronouncement on - a

given fact pattern and its legal implications, the bureaucratic and
procedural imperatives in the ICSID system would render it difficult for a consolidation of all claims to occur in practice.
The Argentina ICSID cases also could have substantial impli86. See List of Pending Cases, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
pending.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
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cations as a precedent for future international claims relating to
economic crises. If the claimants are successful in the Argentina
cases (and particularly if the outcomes are the same or substantially the same in all of the cases), ICSID could face similar waves
of claims against other countries that - in the context of an economic crisis (real or alleged) - adopt measures arguably contrary
to the BIT obligations of that country to investors of its BIT counterparts. Depending on the outcome of the Argentina claims, such
waves could place further strains on ICSID's resources and institutional reputation.
Additionally, the Argentina claims combined with Argentina's
default on a record eighty-one billion USD of debt could give
renewed impetus to the idea of a bankruptcy system for sovereigns. Although there has been substantial discussion for some
time regarding possible constitution of a "sovereign debt restructuring mechanism" ("SDRM"), no agreement has been reached yet
on how such a mechanism would operate or who would conduct it.
Further, it can be expected that negotiators of future BITs,
and perhaps parties to existing ones (particularly parties from
developing nations), might consider amending their BITs explicitly to grant the parties discretion - in the context of economic crises - to make policy decisions that could affect foreign investors in
a way that might otherwise be contrary to BIT obligations." In
any event, for the time being and except in cases where such an
amendment may be effected (or even more drastic measures
adopted"'), states facing an economic crisis will need to take into
account their BIT obligations in making decisions on palliative
measures.

87. In such event the treaty negotiators would grapple with the difficult issue of
how to define "economic crisis" and whether or not to make the relevant
determinations "self-judging" (i.e., a subjective assessment by the relevant State
Party to the BIT, not subject to review by an international tribunal).
88. It is worth noting that some States are considering the possibility of
terminating certain BITs due to the liability exposure and costs of defending itself in
complex international arbitrations. See, e.g., LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR (InterAmerican Dialogue, Sept. 23, 2004) (reporting on Ecuador's Attorney General
announcement that he is studying the possibility of terminating Ecuador's BIT with
the United States).

